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L Introduction
How often has it been said by administrators, politicians and members of
the general public that a certain law is good, the problem is that it is not
enforced?1 The very form of the question expresses the fact that for the
general public and politicians alike, not to mention the legal profession,
the law is usually thought of as that which is written in the books. In
reality, however, that written law is only part of a much broader legal
process which includes the decisions of those charged with the
responsibility of enforcement and, indeed, the activities of judges and
juries as well.
A serious, even critical, problem ensues when the law is considered to
be only that which is written in the statutes and case books, and is severed
from the enforcement decisions of prosecutors and administrators. The
fact is that decisions made by these individuals breathe life into the law.
If the courts and the legal profession ignore that reality, then the promise
of fundamental rights as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms will be only partially met. Regardless of the difficulties, law
must be viewed as a process whose real effects can be measured only in
the impact it has on the lives of those who are subject to it. Only from
that perspective can it be seen that decisions about enforcement are as
important - perhaps even more important - than decisions about the
written law.
This paper focuses on situations where people are exposed to unequal
legal treatment based not on who they are, but on mere chance in the
enforcement of the law.2 The unequal treatment is not aimed at anyone's
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1. See, ag., Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, (1964). See especially Chapter 3: The
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2. Our focus in this paper is on the narrow problem of enforcement in the context of criminal
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group characteristics but rather occurs because an administrator or a
prosecutor enforces a regulatory regime or law in a manner that treats
similarly situated people in a dissimilar fashion.
There are two basic types of enforcement situations which we will
consider. One is where a prosecutor is bringing an action under the
Criminal Code; the other involves an administrator who decides to bring
an action under a regulatory regime. The administrator, in Canada, does
not bring the action directly, but recommends to the Justice Department
that charges be laid. Generally, the recommendation is adopted if, in the
opinion of the Justice Department, there is sufficient evidence for counsel
to make a respectable case. Thus, considerable discretion exists.
Unfortunately, both the prosecutor and the administrator often exercise
their discretion in ways that result in similarly situated people being
treated differently. In fact, as will be explored below, the traditional
judicial approach to prosecutorial and administrative discretion in
enforcement has done very little to control the various adverse effects that
can result from such unchecked discretion.
Traditional notions of equal protection are rarely applied to
prosecutorial or administrative discretion in enforcement. Usually, only
the laws and regulations are analyzed to ascertain whether they provide
for equal treatment; but frequently variations in treatment under the law
occur solely because of prosecutorial or administrative discretion in
enforcement. In Britian and Canada (before the Charter) the traditional
view was that virtually unfettered discretion should be afforded
administrators or prosectors. The American approach is similar, except
where discretionary administrative behaviour has deliberate adverse
effects on certain racial groups.3
This paper will explore the question whether administrative or
prosecutorial discretion should be more closely controlled by the courts
in order to afford a greater degree of equality and fairness; and, if so, how
such equal treatment might actually be provided. In order to analyze
these two questions, an important preliminary issue needs to be
addressed: should the actual outcomes that result from discretionary
decisions about enforcement be subject to a judicial standard of fairness
and equality?
and quasi-criminal administrative legislation. We do not address the much broader issue of the
policy considerations which lie behind implementing such laws, which would involve the
analysis of their corresponding regulatory inducements and enticements.
3. The American approach to administrative and prosecutorial discretion in enforcement has
been shaped significantly by the 1886 decision of the United States Supreme Court in ick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (1886). In this case, which dealt with deliberate, racial
discrimination in the granting of a municipal licence to operate a laundry, the Court established
that administrative discretion will be limited where equal treatment is deliberately denied on
racial grounds.
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While many commentators and some Anglo-Canadian judicial
decisions suggest a positive answer to this question, current legal thinking
has yet to focus on how exactly the outcomes of prosecutorial and
administrative decisions to enforce should be reviewed. This difficulty
arises because traditional legal thinking largely ignores the fact that while
legislation or regulations may demand a certain standard of enforcement,
the actual behaviour of officials charged with enforcement creates a
different standard. Such a situation occurs because officials or prosecutors
fail to enforce to the extent demanded by the law entirely or because they
enforce according to a different standard than that required by the
legislation or regulations. The difficulty that our legal system continues to
have in grappling with the problem of administrative and prosecutorial
discretion in enforcement frequently results in the creation of a significant
gap between the law as it is written and the law as it is practiced.
I. The Gap Between Law and Practice
On reflection, few are surprised at the fact that there is often a substantial
gap between the law as it is written, which we will term the black letter
law, and the law as it is applied, which we will term the de facto norm.
While lawyers and judges tend to focus on the black letter law, for those
subject to the law, it is largely the de facto norm which matters. An
example will clarify this point.4
Suppose that there are legislation and regulations in force (black letter
law) which strictly limit pollution from pulp and paper mills, but that
there are no prosecutions despite continuing violations. Instead, the
administrators charged with enforcement insist on pursuing negotiations
that result in "agreements" that the various mills will undertake to meet
a lesser standard over a period of time. The defacto norm in this situation
is that most mills need not fear prosecution but must be prepared to
negotiate the time required to meet the lesser standard. What is important
to the mill owner is the de facto norm, not the black letter law (unless
they are the same). In order to decide whether he should install expensive
pollution control equipment, the plant owner must make a calculation
based primarily on his expectation of the likely behaviour of officials. The
legislation and regulations must also be considered, however, because it
4. This situation arises in a number of different contexts, and is illustrated most clearly in the
area of environmental law. For a discussion of the problem associated with the difference
between the defacto qorm and the black letter law in the environmental law context, see M.
Rankin and P. Finlde, "The Enforcement of Environmental Law: Taking the Environment
Seriously", (1983) 17 U.B.C.L.R. 35. See also Law Reform Commission of Canada, Policy
Implementation, Compliance and Administrative Law, [Working Paper 51] (Ottawa:
Information Canada: 1986).
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is always possible that officials might choose to act according to the black
letter laws.5 It is worth noting that most drivers make a similar
calculation when they choose to violate speed laws on the highway.
Whether it is acknowledged or not, the de facto norm is of central
concern to those who are subject to the law. Indeed, it may be argued
that the defacto norm is, in fact, the real rule. This norm is derived from
the behavior of officials and the consequent expectations of those subject
to that behaviour and may or may not be related to the black letter law.
The defacto norm may be quite clear, where there is a discernible pattern
of official behaviour, or it may be almost without content, where officials
seem to be acting in an ad hoc manner. When the black letter law is
enforced, then it becomes the defacto norm.
If the defacto norm is based on discernible regular official behaviour,
those subject to the law can order their behaviour in conformity with it.
But there looms the ever present threat that the official might "throw the
book" at the person obeying the de facto norm by enforcing the law
according to the black letter law. Such arbitrary behaviour would be both
unfair and unequal. Moreover, not everyone may be aware that a lesser
level of compliance is required, resulting in the unequal application of the
law. Indeed, the fact that a lesser standard is required is sometimes
deliberately concealed from the general public. Hence, the less
knowledgeable or more naive may adhere to the black letter law with the
result that they are penalized compared with those who follow the de
factor norm as compliance with the black letter law will require a greater
expenditure of effort or resources.
A more serious problem arises when the black letter law is not
regularly enforced by officials and there is no discernible pattern to
provide those subject to the law with a reasonable expectation about
what behaviour might be anticipated regarding enforcement. In such a
situation, there is no de facto norm or it may be said to lack content.
Here, there is a virtual certainty that equal protection will not, indeed
cannot, be afforded to those subject to the law. Similarly, those subject to
the law cannot reasonably order their behaviour since they don't know
what to expect. Those who choose to obey the black letter law receive an
insurance policy against the sanctions of the regulation, but the cost is
excessive, especially if no enforcement actions are taken against non-
complying competitors. In this situation, the law abiding person is almost
always penalized as against the law breaker.
5. We are endebted to Professors Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell for their work in the
area of policy-oriented decision-making. See especially M.S. McDougal, "Law as a Process of
Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study", (1956) 1 Nat.L.E 53.
An interesting case upholding the legality of prosecutorial action based on black letter law
in the context of a 'no prosecution' policy is R. v. Cataqas (1977), 2 C.R.(3d) 328.
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It is clear that the behaviour of officials regarding the enforcement of
legislation or regulations is, from the perspective of those subject to the
law, a significant variable, if not their most important single concern.
When official behaviour towards legislation or regulation diverges widely
from the black letter law then, as we have seen, significant problems may
arise for those subject to the law. Indeed, the legislation or regulations
may be modified in ways wholly unanticipated by Parliament or the
responsible minister or it may effectively be nullified. In spite of this, the
traditional judicial approach to discretion in enforcement has been to
allow virtually unlimited latitude to administrators and prosecutors.6
1 . The TraditionalApproach Reconsidered7
In the traditional, pre-Charter Anglo-Canadian approach to the
discretion of officials to prosecute in criminal cases, the courts have
jurisdiction and can order officials to prosecute in order to uphold the
law. On the other hand, prosecutors have wide discretion to decline
prosecution of individual cases or even whole classes of cases. There have
been very few attempts to enforce the duty to prosecute, perhaps because
in nearly every situation the discretion of officials to decline prosecution
has been upheld. The traditional approach is derived largely from case
law; legislation regarding prosecutorial discretion has either codified the
case law or, by virtue of its silence, approved the status quo.8
Two British cases provide a clear statement of the traditional approach
to prosecutorial discretion. The cases are particularly striking because in
6. While this paper is essentially analytical, there is some descriptive literature which suggests
that a serious substantive problem of uneven enforcement results from uncontrolled
prosecutorial and administrative discretion. See generally: "Compliance with Federal Statutes:
A Draft Information Paper", (Unpublished) Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1984, which
describes considerable disparity in the enforcement of federal legislation, particularly at pages
5-13. The Aeronautics Ac R.S.C. 1970, c. A-3, and its regulations are one example cited at
p.ll, though the paper is essentially an overview. See also A. Sanders "Prosecution Decisions
and the Attorney General's Guidelines", 1985 Crim.L.Rev., at p.4, which documents very
considerable disparity in handling various enforcement situations by the police in Britain.
Disparity in treatment is related to geography (rural v. urban), class, race, and sex.
While there has been, rightly, a call for more work in Canada on the actual facts of disparity
in enforcement, such work is by its very nature difficult to undertake because so many
decisions are made informally and at a relatively low level. Experience in the Canadian federal
context suggets that such work can be undertaken most easily only with the full cooperation
of the administrators themselves.
7. We are endebted to Donna Morgan for her excellent examination of this area: "Controlling
Prosecutorial Powers - Judicial Review, Abuse of Process and Section 7 of the Charter"
(1987), 29 Crim. Law Q. 15, in which she describes the traditional approach to unfettered
discretion, and the potential for abuse of power which this approach fosters when prosecutorial
action is insulated from judicial review.
8. By virtue of their silence, both the Judicial Review Procedure Act R.S.O. 1980, c.224, and
the Federal CourtAc4 R.S.C. 1970, c.10, are consistent with the traditional approach.
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both the courts acknowledge that the decision of the prosecutor not to
enforce can and does annul the effect of the legislation in question. The
Ex Parte Blackburn cases involved the decision of officials not to
prosecute cases arising under the gaming laws in 1968 and under the
pornography laws in 1973.9 In both cases, the Court of Appeal affirmed
the jurisdiction of the courts over prosecutorial discretion and suggested
that there is a legal remedy in a writ of mandamus to order an official to
prosecute. Similarly, the court in both cases found that the officials
responsible for prosecutions are under a duty to prosecute in order to
uphold the law. However, the court also held in both cases that there is
a discretion to decline to prosecute for a wide variety of reasons. As a
result, it respected the discretion of the officials in question in each of the
cases and declined to order prosecutions.
While these two cases provide a useful statement of the law as it has
been understood by the courts, the reasoning that lies behind it is not so
clear. For example, there is no guidance in either judgment as to when a
mandamus would be granted. In the pornography case, there was no
explanation of why the Court of Appeal declined to grant the writ. In the
first Blackburn case the court did explore the nature of ministerial control
over the prosecutor in the specific situation under consideration. 10 It
found that there was no direct political control and that if control existed
it was indirect through the power of dismissal or the budgetary process.
Leaving aside the accuracy of this finding, it is somewhat surprising that
the court did not link this discussion to its decision not to control
prosecutorial discretion.
The two Blackburn cases are similar to most pre-Charter Canadian
decisions on prosecutorial discretion in several ways. First, the courts in
Canada as in Britain assert jurisdiction over this discretion. Further, the
courts in both countries suggest that there is a legal duty to enforce the
law and that prosecutors could be enjoined to enforce, either because
failing to do so would be a breach of that duty or because they might
abuse their discretion in other ways. In the final analysis, however, in
both countries it is difficult to find any case where a court has, in fact,
controlled the discretion to prosecute by actually enjoining a prosecutor.
Administrative discretion to enforce regulations or legislation has been
classified and treated differently from prosecutorial discretion. However,
the actual outcomes and problems that result from uncontrolled
9. R? v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, exparte Blackburn (No.1), [1968] 1 All
E.R. 763, [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 (C.A.); R v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, exparte
Blackburn (No.3), [1973] 1 All E.R. 324, 1 Q.B. 241 (C.A.). See also Gouriet v. Union of Post
Office Workers, [1977] 1 All E.R. 696, [1978] A.C. 435 (H.L.)
10. Id, [1968] 1 All E.R. 763, at 769, [1968] 2 QB. 118, at 135.
40 The Dalhousie Law Journal
administrative discretion are similar. Before turning to a closer
examination of the problems which arise from uncontrolled discretion in
enforcement,1 ' it may first be useful to review briefly the traditional, pre-
Charter Canadian approach to administrative enforcement.
In Harcourt v. Minister of Transport,12 the trial division of the Federal
Court held that it would not substitute its judgment for that of the
officials concerned so long as they acted reasonably in reaching their
decision not to prosecute. This traditional administrative law doctrine
was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court shortly after Harcourt in a 1975
decision of Dickson J. (as he then was):
There can be no doubt that a statutory tribunal cannot, with impunity,
ignore the requisites of its constituent statute and decide questions in any
way it sees fit. If it does so, it acts beyond the ambit of its powers, fails to
discharge its public duty and departs from legally permissible conduct.
Judicial intervention is then not only permissible but requisite in the public
interest. But if the Board acts in good faith and its decisions can be
rationally supported on a construction which the relevant language may
reasonably be considered to bear, then the Court will not intervene.
(emphasis added)13
The result of the application of this doctrine to administrative discretion
in enforcement is that courts will rarely interfere with the discretion.
Hence, administrators are free to exercise their discretion to prosecute in
virtual disregard of the surrounding circumstances.
While the courts and legal commentators have put forward
explanations for this traditional approach to administrative discretion,
few attempts have been made to explain the special issues which relate to
the discretion to prosecute. Yet these special issues are quite similar,
whether the discretion to enforce is being exercised by prosecutors or
administrators.
When a court is faced with issuing a writ of mandamus which orders
officials to prosecute in a particular action or class of actions a
supervisory problem arises. The court is faced with having to supervise or
to manage the activities of the official(s) it has placed under court order.
This is a particularly difficult and complex undertaking in the context of
an order to prosecute since it could involve, at least indirectly, all the
11. It should be understood that what we term "uncontrolled discretion" is actually discretion
that is subject neither to political nor judicial control; there may, of course, be internal
bureaucratic control being exercised but the exact nature of that control is difficult to ascertain.
It is possible that such control is reasonable and it may even accord with Charter limitations;
but if it is not subject to some external scrutiny, one is left to take it in faith that Charter limits
are observed.
12. [1973] EC. 1181 (T.D.).
13. Service Employees' International Union, Local No. 333 v. Nipiwin District Staff Nurses'
Association, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382, at 388-389,41 D.L.R.(3d) 6, at 11.
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necessary activities that go into bringing the case to trial. Moreover, such
an undertaking could involve the expenditure of considerable sums of
public monies and the reordering of budgetary priorities. While it is
evident that the problems of supervision in such circumstances are
formidable, it is the political issues which probably have been decisive for
the courts.
Perhaps the single most persuasive consideration that has kept courts
from interfering with administrative and prosecutorial decisions
regarding enforcement of the law or regulatory regimes has been that the
officials exercising discretion were thought to be directly or indirectly
subject to political control. Since administrative discretion in
enforcement could be controlled by Ministers or other responsible
politicians, judicial intervention need extend, with certain exceptions,
only to the control of quasi-judicial bodies which are not directly subject
to political control. This argument was persuasive, even convincing, in
Britain and Canada when ministerial supervision of officials was more
reality than myth and in the absence of consitutionally entrenched rights
to equality and fairness. 14 Changed legal circumstances combined with
accumulated experience suggest that a reconsideration of the traditional
Anglo-Canadian approach to administrative discretion is timely and may
be necessary in view of the requirements of the Charter. Unfortunately,
the traditional approach remains highly influential and it may be difficult
to develop meaningful judicial standards to control the discretion of
prosecutors and administrators in enforcing the law.
There is today a real need to develop a new judicial approach to
controlling discretion in enforcement, whether prosecutorial or
administrative. The most important reason to enhance judicial control of
discretion in enforcement is rooted in the fact that the way the law is
enforced shapes the reality of the law for those subject to it. That the
approach to enforcement taken by officials can have the effect of
annulling the law and changing regulatory standards and that serious
unfairness and inequality in treatment result, should constitute a most
persuasive argument for enhanced judicial supervision. There are,
however, other reasons to develop a new judicial approach to discretion
in enforcement.
First, while the concept of ministerial responsibility remains the most
salient means of assigning responsibility in a parliamentary system, the
routine decisions of officials regarding enforcement are, in fact, rarely
14. Now that both officials and their ministers are subject to Charter limitations with respect
to their decision-making powers, direct judicial supervision of officials' discretionary power
seems to be less of a break with the tradition of parliamentary government than has previously
been argued. See Operation Dismantle Inc. v.R., infra, note 46.
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supervised by ministers or other elected officials. The administrative
apparatus in virtually all Western democracies has become so large and
complex that it is nearly impossible for ministers to be aware of
individual actions.15 Moreover, there are few effective policies to govern
administrative discretion in enforcement. Even if more of such policies
were developed, they would still be implemented without close
ministerial supervision. While ministerial involvement does still exist in
terms of political responsibility, actual supervisory control has passed to
officials except in unusual circumstances.
Another reason why judicial standards should now exert real control
over prosecutorial and administrative discretion in enforcement is that
there is no other way to assure that Charter-based protection can be
meaningfully provided to those entitled to it. The legal system must
provide such protection if citizens are to believe that the law as they
experience and perceive it meets the standards of fairness and equality set
down in the Charter. A retreat from reality into formalistic legal fiction
would render a most important aspect of Charter protection moot.' 6 It
should be recognized that if the courts are actually to provide for
fundamental fairness and equality then it is inevitable that prosecutorial
and administrative discretion in enforcement will have to be judicially
limited and structured.
If Canadian courts are to undertake the difficult task of structuring
official discretion in enforcement in order to assure more equal and fair
treatment of those subject to the law, they must be persuaded that
without their intervention a significant aspect of equal protection will be
lost. The courts must, in addition, be convinced that a workable standard
can be developed that would, at once, structure the discretion of officials
in a way that would provide fair and substantially equal treatment, while
allowing sufficient discretion to permit variation where this is equitable
and to provide for a reasonable measure of administrative flexibility. This
paper will later address Canadian Charter-based arguments to structure
discretion in enforcement in order to provide for greater fairness and
equality of treatment in enforcement. First, however, it may be useful to
discuss the American experience with prosecutorial and administrative
discretion in enforcement in order to ascertain if their approach to this
problem can offer any insights that may be relevant to our situation in
Canada.
15. See editorial by Hugh Winsor, Globe and Mail, Jan. 18, 1988, at p. A2.
16. It has been argued that perhaps the most important function of a charter of rights is to
influence the values and expectations of citizens. For a discussion and defence of this argument,
see Alan C. Cairns, "Comment on 'Critics of the Judicial Committee: The New Orthodoxy
and an Alternative Explanation"', CJ.P.S. 1986 vol. 19:3, at 521.
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IV The American Approach
The American approach to both prosecutorial and administrative
discretion in enforcement has been characterized by even greater judicial
reluctance to interfere than that demonstrated by Anglo-Canadian courts.
From the earliest cases to the most recent, the United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that "the Executive Branch has exclusive
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
case."' 17 In fact, in several cases where mandamus was being sought to
force prosecution by a United States Attorney, courts have held that they
do not have jurisdiction to interfere.18
This approach to prosecutorial discretion is somewhat surprising given
legislation which states that "Each United States Attorney, within his
district, shall prosecute for all offences. . ." (emphasis added) 19. In fact, the
statute is commonly interpreted to mean that an Attorney may prosecute
for some offences.20 While it would appear on first glance that the
legislation would support those who wish to bring suits in mandamus
against the Attorney General to compel that official to take an action, in
practice this has not been the case. The reason can be traced to the 1868
Supreme Court decision in the Confiscation Cases.21 Although they did
not involve a prosecution, the Court nevertheless took the opportunity in
obiter dicta to interpret the U.S. Attorney's statute as conferring an
absolute discretionary rather than imperative power. The Court stated:
Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to which they are
returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district attorney, and
even after they are entered in court, they are so far under his control that
he may enter a nolle prosequi at any time before the jury is empanelled for
the trial of the case, except where it is otherwise provided in some act of
Congress.22
This "hands-off" approach to prosecutorial discretion has come under
some criticism from within the American judiciary, as exemplified by the
1956 Supreme Court decision in Berra v. US.23 In that case, Black and
Douglas JJ. argued in dissent that prosecutorial discretion was too broad,
especially when it "challenges our concept that all people must be treated
alike under the law. This principle means that no different or higher
17. United States v.Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, at 693 (1974).
18. See, eg., United States v. Cox, 342 E2d. 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 381 U.S. 935 (1965);
and Newman v. United States, 382 E2d. 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
19. United StatesAttorneys Statute, 28 U.S.C. 547.
20. K.C. Davis, Adminitrative Law Treatise, (1979), at 237.
21. 19 L.Ed. 196,7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 454 (1868).
22. Id, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 454, at 457.
23. 351 U.S. 131, 76 S.Ct. 685 (1956).
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punishment should be imposed upon one than another if the offence and
circumstances are the same." 24 The case involved the discretion of the
prosecutor to choose either a felony or misdemeanor prosecution under
identical facts. At trial, the judge denied the jury the opportunity to hear
and to make a choice between the two violations and it was on this basis
that the case was appealled. Despite the dissent by Black and Douglas
JJ., the practice of permitting virtually unfettered discretion to
prosecutors has continued.
The American approach to administrative discretion in enforcement
has been marked by this same reluctance by the courts to interfere.
However, the reasoning in such cases has been somewhat different in that
the courts have at least asserted their jurisdiction to review. Two striking
illustrations of the way American courts have treated administrative
discretion to enforce are Mooq Industries v. ETC. (1958)25 and ETC. v.
Universal-Rundle Corp. (1967)26. In both these cases, the Federal Trade
Commission brought a prosecution against one company for a trade
practice that was industry wide. The prosecuted companies sought stays
of prosecution until cases could be brought against the rest of the
violators in the industry arguing that otherwise they would be put out of
business. In both cases, the Supreme Court permitted the administrator
unfettered discretion stating in Universal-Rundle that:
Even if a petitioner succeed(s) in demonstrating to the Commission that all
of its competitors were engaged in illegal price discrimination practices
identical to its own, and that enforcement of an order might cause it
substantial financial injury the Commission would not necessarily be
delayed to withhold enforcement of the order.27
There are few indications in the cases why the U.S. Supreme Court,
which has been boldly creative and interventionist is no many situations,
has taken such a narrow approach on the issue of prosecutorial or
administrative discretion in enforcement. There are probably two reasons
for the Court's reluctance to intervene in these situations.
First, according to K.C. Davis, legal thinking in the United States is
unable to conceive of a reasonable alternative that would allow justice to
be rendered on an individualized basis other than by broad discretion in
enforcement.28 Davis also believes that the courts and legal commenta-
tors in the United States are concerned about how to deal with essentially
symbolic legislation that is too strict to be enforced without a great deal
24. Id, at 140 (U.S.), 691 (S.Ct.).
25. 35 U.S. 411, 78 S.Ct. 377 (1958).
26. U.S. 244, 87 S.Ct. 1622 (1967).
27. Id, at 251 (U.S.), 1627 (S.Ct.).
28. See generally K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice, (1969), at 33-42.
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of leeway as provided by administrative or prosecutorial discretion. 29
Davis has led the recent academic challenge to the traditional American
approach to discretion in enforcement. His works have provided
alternative models, drawn from the experiences of other countries, and he
asserts that the American approach may be the least satisfactory of all.30
A second concern of the U.S. Supreme Court in this matter is with the
interference with the division of powers which would arise if the judiciary
were to control the executive's power of discretion. This reason was cited
as being decisive in several cases.3 The Court has, however, on many
occasions put limitations on how the executive may undertake its
activities, and has not shied away from holding state and federal
legislation to be unconstitutional. The argument that the division of
powers in and of itself precludes any judicial control of discretion in
enforcement is somewhat strange since the entire subject of administra-
tive law involves nothing more than constraining, shaping, and
controlling executive and legislative power.
It is both surprising and disturbing that the American courts have not
been more active and innovative on this subject. Despite being in the
home of legal realism,3 2 the courts in the United States have steadfastly
refused to consider the actual outcomes that have followed from the
exercise of discretion. Instead, they have taken what can only be
described as a formalistic approach which denies or ignores the actual
effects that enforcement decisions have on those who are actually subject
to the law.
The abuses of process which have resulted from this approach are well
documented by Davis and others.33 However, the public cynicism and
distrust that may be engendered by this failure by the judiciary to
supervise the administration ofjustice cannot be adequately documented;
these are the serious hidden costs of unstructured and arbitrary discretion.
29. See Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, supra, note 2.
30. Of the alternatives put forward by Davis in Part VII of his text, he cites the West German
prosecuting system as a viable alternative to broad prosecutorial discretion in enforcement. See
supra note 29, at 191-195.
31. Supra, notes 18, 19, 24, 26, 27. See also, N. Abrams, "Internal Policy: Guiding the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion", 19 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1 (1971); and J. Vorenburg,
"Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power", 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1521.
32. The credo of the American legal realist movement is that the courts should address the
actual effects of the legal process rather than continue to follow a mode of legal analysis which
obscures the reality of that process as it is experienced by those engaged by it. The theory finds
cogent expression in Llewellyn, Jurispndence" Realism in Theory and Practic, (1962).
33. See particularly Davis' examination of unstructured discretion in the contexts of banking
regulations, the United States Parole Board, and sentencing procedures in the United States,
supra, note 29, at 120-140.
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In the final analysis, the American experience provides an illustration of
what lies at the end of the wrong road.
V The Post-Charter Canadian Approach
Prior to 1982, the Canadian approach to administrative and prosecutorial
discretion was consistent with the traditional British approach, as stated
in the Ex Parte Blackburn cases. As discussed above, the hallmark of this
approach is that while the courts are willing to claim jurisdiction over the
executive in matters concerning the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion
in enforcement, they are unwilling to interfere with that discretion, even
where this may result in a de facto annulment of the black letter law. A
similar approach was taken regarding administrative discretion in
enforcement.
The tolerance which this traditional approach showed for virtually
unfettered discretion in enforcement by the executive remained
unaffected by the coming into force of the Canadian Bill of Rights in
1960.34 The key reason why the Bill of Rights failed to effect any
significant change in the courts' approach to reviewing discretion was
that, as a statute, the Bill of Rights did not demonstrate any intent by
Parliament to change the status quo. This principle was articulated by the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Drybones,35 The first and only case in
which the Court held a section of a federal statute to be inoperative by
virtue of its inconsistency with the Bill of Rights.
This judicial attitude to the Bill of Rights was echoed by the Court in
the 1971 decision in Smythe v. The Queen.36 In that case, Fauteux C.J.C.
held that the Attorney General's discretion in proceeding summarily or
by way of indictment under s.137 of the Income Tax Act37 was absolute.
The American constitutional guarantee of equality before the law had no
effect on the Canadian interpretation of the equality provisions of the Bill
of Rights, "notwithstanding any similarity of wording between the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and the
relevant provisions of the Candian Bill of Rights."38
The basis of Fauteux C.J.C.'s finding was the proposition that it is an
essential feature of our Anglo-Canadian concept of equality before the
law that all individuals be subject to the same forces of executive power,
even where that power is manifest in the Attorney General's absolute
34. Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II.
35. [1970] S.C.R. 282,9 D.L.R.(3d) 473.
36. [1971] S.C.R. 680, 16 C.R.N.S. 147.
37. Income TaxAc4 R.S.C. 1970, c.I-5.
38. Supra, note 36, at 684 (S.C.R.), 149 (C.R.N.S.).
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discretion to elect the mode of a criminal prosecution.3 9 In other words,
the equality which Fauteux recognized was the equality to be treated as
the Attorney General so decided, even where that decision resulted in
unequal treatment. It was from this stance that the Chief Justice
concluded:
... I am unable to infer from the provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights
any suggestion that Parliament differed from that view or had any
intention to depart so radically from that state of the law ... In brief,
appellant's submission is potentially destructive of statutory ministerial
discretion.., and tantamount to a recognition that Parliament has used
an oblique method to paralyze the administration of the law.40
Judicial acceptance of this interpretation of equality under the Bill of
Rights, and particularly the approach allowing complete, unfettered
discretion in enforcement, has remained unchanged for the last two
decades. The spirit of the Bill of Rights was never fully realized because
the courts consistently refused to interpret it in a broad, far-reaching
manner.
Indeed, it was not until the coming into force of the Charter that a
special, constitutional status was given to fundamental rights in Canada.
In the present context, the key Charter provisions are section 15 on equal
protection and treatment before the law and section 7 on fundamental
fairness. In considering the legal impact of these sections, it is necessary
to recognize the new and developing approaches taken by the Supreme
Court in interpreting the Charter. From the Court's first decision under
the Charter, Law Soc. of Upper Canada v. Skopinker,41 the court has
made it clear that it will give a broad, purposive interpretation to
fundamental, individual rights. The narrow approach taken with the Bill
of Rights is to have no place under our new Constitution. As Estey J.
wrote on behalf of the Court:
There are some simple but important considerations which guide a Court
in construing the Charter, and which are more sharply focussed and
discernible than in the case of the federal Bill of Rights. The Charter comes
from neither level of the legislative branches of government but from the
Constitution itself. It is part of the fabric of Canadian law.42
Five months later the Chief Justice was to strengthen the claim that a
new approach to the interpretation of rights must be taken under the
Charter when he wrote:
39. Id, at 686 (S.C.R.), 151 (C.R.N.S.).
40. Id, at 686-687 (S.C.R.), 152 (C.R.N.S.).
41. [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357,8 C.R.R. 193.
42. Id, at 366 (S.C.R.), 200 (C.R.R).
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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive document.
Its purpose is to guarantee and protect, within the limits of reason, the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines. It is intended to
constrain governmental action. (emphasis added)43
As broad and far-reaching as these expressions of the Charter's scope
seemed to be, it was not until May, 1985 that the Court was finally to
remove all doubt that all acts of government must comply with the
requirements of the Charter as "the supreme law of Canada",44 whether
they be authorized by royal prerogative or statute. The turning point can
be found in the decision of the Court in the controversial case of
Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R..45 The significance of this decision, both
in terms of strengthening the power of the Court as well as reaffirming the
primacy of the Charter, lies in the Court's assertion that even
discretionary foreign policy decisions of Cabinet are subject to the review
of and are limited by the Charter. Prior to this decision, a distinction had
been implicitly drawn whereby orders-in-council derived from Cabinet's
legislative authority were susceptible to judicial review, whereas those
derived from Cabinet's sovereign, prerogative power were not.46 Wilson
J. clearly scotched that distinction when she wrote:
Since there is no reason in principle to distinguish between cabinet
decisions pursuant to statutory authority and those made in the exercise of
the royal prerogative, and since the former clearly fall within the ambit of
the Charter, I conclude that the latter do so also.47
The effect of this decision can be compared to the famous Marbury v.
Madison48 decision of the United States Supreme Court because it
significantly broadened the class of government actions which fall under
the Court's supervisory jurisdiction. Operation Dismantle goes even
further than this landmark American case because it makes it clear that
all aspects of legislative and executive decision-making must satisfy the
requirements of the Charter, and that the Court has jurisdiction to strike
down any executive action or law which is inconsistent with those
requirements to the extent of its inconsistency.
Of particular relevance to this paper is the question of what effect the
Operation Dismantle principle will have on the exercise of judicial
control over administrative and prosecutorial discretion in enforcement.
43. Hunter et aL v. Southam Inc., [198412 S.C.R. 145, at 156,9 C.R.R. 355, at 364.
44. Constitua'on Ac, 1982, Part I, s.52(1).
45. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 13 C.R.R. 287.
46. It should be noted that in a pre-Charter decision, the Supreme Court held that Cabinet
decisions made by order-in-council are reviewable on grounds of procedural fairness: Attorney
General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735.
47. Supra, note 46, at 464 (S.C.R.), 303-304 (C.R.R.).
48. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
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It seems clear that, on the basis of the reasoning in Operation Dismantle,
the Court can and will exercise some kind of judicial control over these
types of discretion. It seems equally clear that the Charter applies to both
prosecutorial and administrative decisions regarding enforcement. What
remains unclear is whether the guarantees of equal protection and
fundamental fairness will be applied by the courts to discretion in
enforcement in a meaningful way. This question has yet to be addressed
by the Supreme Court. Two lower court decisions, however, attest both
to the complexity of the issue and to the difficulty the courts are having
in applying the concepts of equal protection and fairness to an area
traditionally untouched by meaningful judicial review.
The first case to address the effect of s.15 upon the prosecutorial
discretion of the Attorney-General was R. v. Kevork et a149 In that case,
the Ontario High Court held that the discretionary power of the
Attorney-General to elect the mode of prosecution does not violate s.15
because it does not affect similarly situated persons dissimilarly. Smith J.
based his conclusion on the argument that any difference in treatment
between alleged offenders must exist only because of the circumstances of
each case, and this is not inequality per se because no two cases are the
same.50 The issue of what degree of 'sameness' would be required in order
to show a violation of s.15 was not addressed by the court. However, it
held that "the absence of those standards does not render the act of the
Attorney-General arbitrary". 51 The court demonstrated that it was
content to follow the traditional doctrine that, so long as the decision was
exercised 'reasonably' and not arbitrarily, there will not be sufficient
grounds for review. The argument that no two cases are the same would
nullify the equal protection guarantees of the Charter because under such
reasoning they could never apply in any case.
This same conclusion was reached by the Ontario Court of Appeal the
following year in R. v. ErteL52 Following the finding in Kevork that "the
purpose of s.15 is to require that those who are similarly situated be
treated similarly",53 the court in Ertel then attempted to reduce some of
the uncertainty created by the adoption of this standard by establishing a
three-step test for determining when s.15 has been violated. Unfortu-
49. (1986), 20 C.R..325.
50. Id, at 335.
51. Id
52. (1987), 20 O.A.C. 257, 35 C.C.C.(3d) 398; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada denied, Dec. 3, 1987, Estey, Wilson, LeDain JJ.
53. Re McDonald and the Queen (1985), 21 D.L.R. (4th) 397, at 417; 51 O.R. (2d) 745, at
765 (Ont. C.A.).
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nately, this attempt to clarify the concept of being 'similarly situated', has
in fact only added to the confusion surrounding s.15.5A
The test posited by the court consists of first determining whether the
impugned law treats the plaintiff differently from persons situated
similarly to him. Parties are deemed to be similarly situated
notwithstanding differences beween them if those differences do not
concern the impugned law's purpose. According to this formulation,
determining what the law's purpose is will determine whether inequality
has occurred. The absence of judicial standards by which to determine a
law's purpose has caused one commentator to note that "the similarly
situated' requirement is at bottom an empty concept".5 5 It also requires
the court to determine the purpose of a law, when there may be many
purposes or none, depending on the law.
The second step in the Ertel test is equally vague. It requires the court
to determine whether the different treatment suffered by the plaintiff
amounts to an "inherent disadvantage".56 The test is vague because the
court offered no criteria by which to measure the claim of an inherent
disadvantage. Furthermore, the onus of proof is on the plaintiff in making
such a claim. The lack of guidance as to the meaning of this concept and
the difficulty in determining the difference between a simple disadvantage
and an inherent disadvantage, make this part of the test so vague as to be
practically unusable.
The final step in the test is arguably the most unacceptable. It requires
that a court not find 'discrimination' contrary to s.15 even in the presence
of unequal treatment and inherent disadvantage unless a "fair minded
person, weighing the purposes of the legislation against its ef-
fects.. .would conclude that the means adopted are unreasonable or
unfair." 57 The key problem with this standard is that it again places an
undue burden on the plaintiff asserting that he has suffered unequal
treatment. By requiring proof that the impugned law is unreasonable, the
Ertel test places on the shoulders of a plaintiff a burden normally
attributed to the state under s.l. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
stated unequivocally that a s.1 analysis of legislative reasonableness and
proportionality must only come after a Charter right has been violated,
and not in the process of providing the violation in the first place.58
54. M. Leopofsky and H. Schwartz have written an interesting case commentary onR. v. Ertel
outlining a number of key problems with the standard developed in the Court of Appeal's
decision. See 67 Cnd. Bar Rev. 115.
55. Id, at 122.
56. Supra, note 53, at 272 (O.A.C.), 420 (C.C.C.).
57. R. v. Century 21 Ramos Realty Inc. and Ramos (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 737, at 762, 19
O.A.C. 25, at 42.
58. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103,26 D.L.R. (4th) 200.
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Despite its deficiencies, the Ertel case illustrates the many complexities
facing the courts in their quest for an acceptable standard by which to
measure the reviewability of prosecutorial discretion under the Charter.
While the test offered in the case is unacceptable for the reasons given, it
is an example of how the courts are searching for a standard which strikes
a balance between permitting the administrator/prosecutor to exercise
reasonable discretion on the one hand and, on the other, requiring that
discretion be subject to Charter limitation. It is to the formulation of a
practical solution to the problem of unstructured discretion that we shall
now turn.
Vi Toward a Remedy and a Judicial Standard 9
The general thrust of thinking about Canadian administrative law over
the last decade has clearly been in favour of greater judicial deference to
administrative action. Perhaps as a consequence of this deference, there
has been increased concern to find non-judicial means to review
administrative decisions. 60 But the adoption of an entrenched Charter
may have changed the legal landscape to such a degree that the
traditional approach may not now be viable. From a political
perspective, a constitutional Charter of Rights has created a more 'rights-
oriented' society in which there is an ever greater concern with both
equality and fairness.61 In such an atmosphere judicial deference to
administrative action is less tenable. From a legal perspective, the Charter
necessitates authoritative interpretations, especially of its more politically
volatile sections. This interpretative function will remain one of great
importance for the courts. It would seem to follow that the judiciary must
also, at least ultimately, decide whether certain forms of administrative
behaviour comply with its interpretation of the Charter. Even if it did
not, escalating political demands for Charter-based rights will, in our
view, ensure that the judiciary has both a central role in interpreting, and
a final say in enjoining, compliance with the Charter. In short, it seems
59. We are endebted to K.C. Davis for his groundbreaking work, Discretionary Jusice, supra,
note 29, which has lead to our own recommendations.
60. This topic was discussed at a recent conference in Toronto which focused on developing
trends in administrative legal theory and the viability of non-judicial mechanisms for reviewing
administrative and prosecutorial action. "Law and Leviathan: The Administrative Law
Challenge in the 1990's" was sponsored by the Law Reform Commission of Canada and the
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, and took place September 29-30, 1988. The
proceedings from this conference are expected to be published shortly by the University of
Toronto Press.
61. Id This thesis is closely examined by Alan Cairns in his paper, "The Nature of the
Canadian Administrative State", which he delivered at the conference. It is expected that this
paper will be published with the proceedings of the conference.
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to us inevitable that the courts will be driven to re-examine the degree of
deference accorded to administrative decisions.
While the shortcomings of judicial review as a means of controlling
administrative actions are well known, it is difficult to see what other
institution could realistically supplant the courts. Even if such an
institution exists or were created, its view on the meaning of the Charter
and its applicability to administrative action would almost certainly be
subject to judicial review regardless.
With this is mind, we believe that judicial interpretation and
application of the Charter must become a key element in shaping
Charter-based limits to administrative action, particularly in the area of
administrative and prosecutorial discretion in enforcement. This may
necessitate a more innovative and creative approach to judicial review. In
considering a judicial standard to limit administrative and prosecutorial
discretion in enforcement, it may be worthwhile to recall briefly the three
principal concerns which arise from unchecked and unstructured
administrative or prosecutorial discretion.
First, the use of unstructured discretion to prosecute in order to
provide individualized justice, which some consider its most compelling
justification, may result in a denial of equal protection. Purely
individualized decisions almost always result in similarly situated people
being treated dissimilarly. A second concern is that it permits the
prosecutor or administrator to make de facto changes in laws or
regulations ranging from modification to outright annulment. What we
have termed de facto norms may thus be created without public
knowledge and in the absence of political scrutiny. The use of discretion
to modify or to annul legislation is justified as being necessary in order to
adapt the law to reality. Finally, unfettered discretion in enforcement has
traditionally been justified because decisions about enforcement are
considered to be either political in nature or administrative tasks that
require a particular type of expertise. Considered in either context,
decisions about enforcement are thought to involve non-judicial, perhaps
even non-legal, considerations. Hence, except in the rare circumstance of
clear and deliberate abuse, the courts should not interfere with discretion
in enforcement.
It may also be useful to consider the difference between a judicial
standard and one that might be used by an administrator or prosecutor.
A judicial standard must be applicable to many different situations, and
usuable by diverse officials. Hence, it needs to be formulated in quite
general terms. In addition, a judicial standard must be formulated both
on the basis of Charter requirements and in a manner that takes account
of practical problems such as the difficulties involved when courts are
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called on to supervise or manage complex tasks. Finally, a judicial
standard should be clear in guiding officials with respect to how they
should act. An administrative standard, in contrast, should be designed to
meet the needs of a particular organization in any of a variety of ways
and, where appropriate, must fit within the judicial standard.
Judicial standards are generally thought of as being developed
gradually on a case by case basis. While some judicial standards have
evolved in this manner, others have arisen in a leading case and persisted
in much the same form thereafter. In considering prosecutorial and
administrative discretion in enforcement, there are compelling reasons for
the courts to lay down a comprehensive approach to such discretion in a
single case. One reason is that, as is often the case in the common law,
there may be considerable resistance to change from the inertia of
tradition. The existence of inertia is exacerbated by the plain fact that few
officials are willing to give up power, and discretion is power. Hence, the
courts should provide a clear, comprehensive standard for discretion in
enforcement. If necessary, the leading decision with its comprehensive
standard can be modified over time in subsequent cases.
A final consideration relates to the Charter protections that are
applicable to the problem of discretionary enforcement. Both sections 7
and 15 provide the basis for the formulation of a judicial standard to
control prosecutorial and administrative discretion. Section 15 would be
most useful for developing a judicial standard because the idea of treating
similarly situated people the same is for most people easier to understand
than the concept of fundamental fairness. The problem with basing a
judicial standard on equal protection is that section 15 applies only to
individuals and not to corporations or other legal persons.62 It would be
difficult to formulate one standard for individuals, based on section 15,
and another for corporations, based on some other section, probably
section 7.
As is the case with section 15, there are both advantages and
disadvantages to using section 7, the guarantee of fundamental fairness, as
the basis of a judicial standard for limiting discretion in enforcement. Its
main advantage is that it embraces both individuals and other legal
persons so that any standard based on section 7 would be comprehensive
in application. On the other hand, the idea of fairness, as a legal concept,
may be viewed narrowly as applying only to procedure.63 Recent
62. Aluminum Co. of Canada Ltd v. P,. in right of Ontario, Defasco Inc, Intervenor (1987),
55 O.R. 2nd 522, 16 O.A.C. 14 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
63. See generally David Mullan, "Natural Justice -The Challenges of Nicholson, Deference
Theory and the Charter", Recent Developments in Administrative Law, Neil Finkelstein and
Brian Rodgers, eds. (Toronto: CarsweU, 1987).
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decisions of the Supreme Court, however, would seem to indicate that
the right to fundamental justice enshrined in section 7 includes a right to
substantive fairness.64
Nevertheless, even procedural fairness may be seen to be applicable to
the exercise of discretion in enforcement by officials and prosecutors.
This becomes clearer when one considers the purposes of the doctrine of
procedural fairness. From the perspective of the administrator or
prosecutor bringing an action, procedural fairness requires that a
particular structure or form be followed in reaching a decision. An
official is thus bound to follow a process which is less haphazard and
more structured than might otherwise be employed. This form of
decision-making, it is argued, helps safeguard individual rights and may
aid in reaching results that are substantively fair.65
From the perspective of the person who will be subject to the decision,
the purposes of procedural fairness are clearer. It assures, in general, that
the person has the opportunity to make his case to the official. Perhaps
more important, procedural fairness requires that an official's decision be
as intelligible as possible to those subject to it. In essence, the official must
come to his decision through a mode of reasoning that is more open than
might otherwise be the case. Procedural fairness makes the decision-
making process accessible, thereby establishing a crucial safeguard
against arbitrary administrative action.66
As noted, the idea of fairness may also have substantive content.67 If so,
it is likely that substantive fairness will be found to include the idea of
equality, and thus may overlap with and reinforce section 15.68
Whether fundamental fairness is viewed from a procedural or
substantive perspective, it would appear to limit the discretionary powers
64. Ref re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, [1986] 1 W.W.R.
481; and Re Singh and Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 17
D.L.R.(4th) 422,per Wilson J.
65. See Mullan, "Natural Justice", supra note 64. For a historical analysis of the development
of the doctrine of procedural fairness in pre-Charter Canada, see also: Mullan, "Fairness: The
New Natural Justice?" (1975), 25 U.T.L.J. 281; Loughlin, "Procedural Fairness: A Study in
the Crisis of Administrative Law Theory" (1978), 28 U.T.L.J. 215; and "Natural Justice and
Fairness - Substantive as well as Procedural Standards for the Review of Administrative
Decision-Making?" (1982), 27 McGill L.J. 250.
66. For an interesting discussion of the philosophical implications of the legal concept of
fairness, see Rodger Beehler, "The Concept of Fairness", Fairness in Environmental and Social
Impact Assessment Processes, E. Case, P. Finkle, and A. Lucas, eds. (Calgary: Canadian
Institute of Resources Law, 1983), at 1.
67. See Mullan, "Natural Justice", supra note 64, at 24-27.
68. At the time of publication, the Supreme Court of Canada is in the process of deciding its
first appeal concerning section 15 of the Charter: Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,
et aL (1987), 4 W.W.R. 242, 23 C.R.R. 273 (B.C.C.A.); leave to appeal to the S.C.C. granted
November 27, 1986.
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of officials and prosecutors. We therefore suggest that in developing a
judicial standard, both sections 7 and 15 be used as its constitutional
basis. In addition, we suggest that the courts enlarge the existing common
law standard of reasonableness to include the idea of treating similar
situations in the same way, thereby embracing aspects of both fairness
and equal protection. Finally, we-suggest that the courts confront the fact
that any exercise of discretion in enforcement has the potential to
circumvent legislation and regulations. Put another way, the courts
should take account of the problems that arise when there is a significant
gap between the black letter law and the actual behaviour of officials or
prosecutors in exercising discretion in enforcement.
With these problems and considerations in mind, the following judicial
standard is proposed:
In order to provide for fundamental fairness in the exercise of
administrative and prosecutorial discretion in enforcement, persons
in similar situations should be afforded similar treatment. In
considering Charter-based challenges to the exercise of such
discretion, the court will assume the prima facie presence of
fundamental fairness and equality:
a) if the defacto standard enforced under the relevant statute or
regulation is authorized by a written policy developed pursuant
to a process which has provided for public notice and fair
public discussion, and such policy has been approved by the
responsible minister;
b) where individualized justice is being provided for by prosecu-
torial or administrative discretion in enforcement, such special
treatment must be authorized by a specific, pre-existing policy
developed pursuant to a process which includes public notice
and public consultation, and which has been approved by the
responsible minister; and
c) the administrator or prosecutor will be deemed to have made a
reasonable distribution of resources to implement an enforce-
ment strategy where such a distribution is based on a written,
reasonable plan and is approved by the responsible minister.
This proposed judicial standard attempts to increase real ministerial
responsibility while providing for fundamental fairness and equal
protection in administrative and prosecutorial decisions regarding
enforcement. The standard is framed to provide both procedural and
substantive control of discretion in enforcement. If the procedural
standard is met, the burden of proof to demonstrate a lack of fairness
and/or equality must be carried by those who would challenge the acts
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or omissions of an administrator or prosecutor. The substantive standard
remains paramount as it must. However, the procedural standard serves
two important functions. First, it determines who carries the burden of
demonstrating that the substantive standard was or was not met. Second,
the procedural standard provides administrators and prosecutors with
fairly clear guidance on how they should behave in order to provide for
fundamental fairness and equality.
The procedural part of the standard ensures that responsible politicians
will be apprised of and must approve enforcement decisions that may
cause de facto deviations from legislative and regulatory standards and
that they approve policies which govern the provision of individualized
justice. It is noteworthy that the procedural section which provides the
widest latitude concerns the distribution of resources for enforcement
(section c). It should be emphasized that in order to make the proposed
standard flexible, there is no formal requirement to do what is specified
in the three procedural sections; the administrator or prosecutor is obliged
only to afford fundamental fairness and equality in a substantive sense. In
fact, however, most departments that enforce regulatory regimes, and
most attorneys-general, would use the procedural sections as a guide to
incorporate fairness and equality into their discretionary enforcement
decisions. The net result would likely be the development of
comprehensive, public, ministerially approved policies that would
structure discretion in enforcement.
It should be noted that the development of public policies regarding
discretion would draw attention to certain realities relating to
enforcement that have so far escaped close scrutiny. The relationship
between the resources provided for enforcement and the strictness of that
enforcement would become evident. Similarly, the anomally caused by
the gap between black letter law and the defacto norms that result from
enforcement decisions would become clearer. The implications of
opening up enforcement to public and polticial scrutiny will be explored
below in the conclusion. Before examining these macro effects, however,
it may be useful to consider how this standard would be put to use by
defendants being prosecuted or complainants seeking mandamus orders
directing administrators or prosecutors to take action under a regulation
or statute.
The defendant in a criminal or quasi-criminal administrative action
would use the failure of the Crown to provide him with fundamental
fairness and/or equal protection in the exercise of its discretionary
enforcement power to gain a stay of proceedings. This remedy would be
useful to the defendant since, at least temporarily, it would block the
action being brought against him. On the other hand, if the Crown could
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provide evidence that it has met the Charter requirements of fundamental
fairness and equality, then the action could proceed. The staying of
proceedings in such cases, as well as the general anticipation that the
courts would stay subsequent proceedings if the requirements of the
Charter are not met, would encourage both administrators and
prosecutors alike to adopt policies which provide for fundamental
fairness and equality. The procedural sections in the proposed standard
would help them design such policies.
It is noteworthy that providing the remedy of a stay of proceedings
does not involve the court in the supervisory problems that may have
militated against judicial involvement in enforcement situations during
the pre-Charter era. Indeed, the courts need take no part whatever in
formulating the enforcement policies called for by the proposed standard
but need only approve or disapprove of them as measured against the
requirements of the Charter.
The situation is more complex when the enforcement problem consists
in a complainant seeking a mandamus because of a lack of enforcement
action. In such a situation, the judicial response would still be based on
the proposed standard, but the remedy would be different. In a
mandamus situation, the court could enjoin the Crown not to interfere
with the action of a private citizen based on a statute or regulation. The
court might also enjoin the Crown, in the person of a specific
administrator or prosecutor, to produce any evidence in its possession
which might assist a party undertaking a private prosecution. In effect, by
enjoining the Crown in this way, the court would be able to enforce a
Charter-based standard without becoming enbroiled in any of the
supervisory problems associated with the resulting enforcement activities
of the Crown. Those seeking a mandamus will, in all likelihood, be
willing to undertake a private prosecution. Even if they are not, the
court's order enjoining the Crown from interfering with private
prosecutions would constitute an invitation to such actions. 69
By the use of this proposed judicial Charter-based standard, in
conjunction with the two remedies just described, the courts could both
control discretion in enforcement and ensure that enforcement decisions
are being taken pursuant to policies that are subject to public scrutiny and
ministerial approval. This would have not only important legal effects but
could have significant political implications for the drafting of future
statutes and regulations.
The adoption of the proposed judicial standard would result in more
open enforcement policies that would call attention to the gap between
69. See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Private Prosecutions, [Working Paper 52]
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1986).
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the black letter law and actual enforcement practices. Since few
politicians would want to be associated with a policy that results in a
wide gap between law as it is written and the law as it is enforced, there
would be a strong incentive to bring enforcement practices into line with
the written law. In turn, this would necessitate more careful scrutiny of
new regulations and statutes to ascertain whether they are, in fact,
enforceable. Old regulations and statutes might have to be revised or
possibly repealed, particularly where their standards were not designed
with a view to actual enforcement. In short, the overall political effect of
adopting such a standard would be to focus much more attention on the
legislative and regulatory realities of the law. It would no longer be
enough for legislators to consider what statutory or regulatory standard
looked best; the question of what standard is reasonably enforceable
would also have to be posed and answered.
Vii. Conclusion Law as Process
The challenge now facing the courts is to make the Charter real for
Canadians. This can only be done by considering the actual impact of the
law on those subject to it. As we have shown, the real effects of the law
flow not only from statutes and regulations, but also from the decisions
of those with the responsibility to enforce the law. If the Charter is to be
meaningful to Canadians, judicial scrutiny must extend beyond the
written word of the law to include the law in action. In short, the courts
must view the law as a process which includes the decision whether or
not to enforce.
The problem with this approach is clear: if the law is treated as a
process that necessarily includes the decision whether or not to enforce,
the courts will have embarked on a new and largely unexplored path.
Indeed, should this step be taken regarding decisions about enforcement,
could not the argument be extended to ask whether judges should also
examine decisions regarding the award of discretionary benefits by
officials? Deciding to scrutinize seriously discretionary decisions in terms
of their effects could be for the courts the thin edge of the wedge.
The conundrum is that if the courts decline to scrutinize the exercise of
discretion in terms of its actual effects, then the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter will mean less to those entitled to them. More
importantly, when judges decline to see that which is there in plain sight,
the way it is experienced by those subject to the law, where will the
blindness end? Ultimately, no one knows which is the more dangerous
path: the one which engages the full reality of the law or the one which
avoids it.
